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22 Population and development
Dennis Ahlburg and Robert Cassen
The link between population growth and economic development is among
the older issues in social science, particularly because of its association
with the name of Robert Malthus. His famous Essay on Population of 1798
argued that population growth inevitably led to poverty – fundamentally,
he claimed, because it would always outstrip the means of subsistence.
Populations would always increase so that the supply of labour pressed on
wages, to the point where they reached subsistence level. Beyond that point
population would only be held back by war, starvation or disease, but
people would remain poor. While in later editions Malthus modiﬁed his
views considerably, his name is mainly associated with the thesis of his orig-
inal Essay.
This association has hardly been helpful to our subject. Malthus’s early
views were linked to harsh social philosophies, and in the past anyone who
believed that population growth had any kind of negative impact on devel-
opment was commonly labelled as ‘Malthusian’, and often condemned as
a result. Things have changed. Today there is a growing consensus that
rapid population growth in poor countries under conditions of high fertil-
ity can have negative, non-Malthusian, consequences for economic and
social development. But they are not necessarily large, nor are they irreme-
diable. And Malthus was wrong about food supplies, which have consist-
ently outgrown population globally and in most individual countries – with
some, mainly African, exceptions.
Development inﬂuences population growth and vice versa. We will treat




For a long period in human history populations grew very slowly, with
quite high fertility but also high mortality, and episodes of extraordinary
mortality such as the Black Death, which killed one-third of Europe’s
population in the fourteenth century. The ﬁrst key to lower fertility was
usually improvements in mortality. People do not want just babies, but sur-
viving children, and when child survival is low, families will ‘insure’ by
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having large numbers of babies. Once conﬁdent of their children’s survival,
parents may begin to limit the number of children they have.
The ﬁrst widespread decline in fertility occurred in France in the eight-
eenth century. It began to decline in Europe generally in the nineteenth
century, commonly – though not universally – preceded or at least accom-
panied by declining mortality. The fact that historical fertility decline
mainly coincided with increasing prosperity, and is lower today in better-
oﬀ than in poorer countries, gives the (broadly correct) impression that eco-
nomic development is associated with fertility decline. But it is very far
from a simple relationship. On the contrary, while the decline usually starts
with better-oﬀ, urban and educated parents, it can spread to those who do
not have these characteristics. In the developing countries today there is an
association between falls in fertility and mortality improvements, rising
education (especially female education) and the spread of contraception.
But in some countries today there is signiﬁcant fertility decline among the
uneducated and the poor (Bhat, 2002; McNay et al., 2003). At some point
the pace of fertility decline often outruns that of the spread of its correlates
(Van de Kaa, 1996).
Mortality
Much the same may be said of mortality improvement. Historically mor-
tality has responded to the gradual disappearance of major causes of
death – famines, epidemics, contagious diseases – as well as to more fun-
damental forces such as improving nutrition, hygiene and public health
measures. On the whole until relatively recently curative medicine has been
a weaker force. Again broadly there is an association between increasing
prosperity and mortality decline, since prosperity typically brings with it
the things that reduce mortality. But it is a far from straightforward process.
Infant mortality in particular can respond to very speciﬁc interventions,
and throughout history there have been long periods in diﬀerent countries
where living standards have improved but infant mortality has not, and
conversely times when infant mortality has fallen without widespread
improvements in levels of living. (See for example Woods, 2000.)
Mortality in general in developing countries has often fallen rapidly due
to medical and public health interventions; many countries have achieved
in a few decades the kinds of declines in mortality that took a century or
more in countries that are now industrialized. For this reason they have
experienced rates of population growth greatly in excess of those in the
history of the industrialized countries. There is still, though, high mortal-
ity in many developing countries and this is a drag on development.
A number of studies have shown that healthier countries grow faster
(Easterlin, 1996; Bloom and Canning, 1999), and Robert Fogel (1994)
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claimed that synergies between technological and physiological improve-
ments in health account for about one-half of the economic growth in
Europe over the previous two centuries. HIV/AIDS is taking a large toll in
many countries, and has still to reach its peak in several. It too has a nega-
tive impact on development, often killing men and women in their prime
working years, placing huge burdens on health services, and creating mil-
lions of orphans. It has been estimated that in the 1990s, AIDS reduced per
capita annual growth in Africa by 0.8 percentage points. In the worst-
aﬀected countries the reduction in growth was one to two percentage
points. After two decades, the economies of these countries would be about
20 to 40 per cent smaller as a consequence of AIDS (Loewenson and
Whiteside, 2001).
Fertility decline itself contributes to improvements in mortality and
health. Death in childbirth is still a signiﬁcant cause of female mortality in
many developing countries, and high fertility is often associated with higher
rates of child malnutrition in the family.
Population and development
Macroeconomics
One of the major debates in development economics has been over the
macroeconomic role of population growth. In the twentieth century the
seminal work was Coale and Hoover’s 1958 study using the example of
India. It compared two paths for the economy, one with higher fertility than
the other, and reached a powerful conclusion: not only was the growth of
per capita income lower under the high-fertility variant, but also even the
growth of aggregate gross national product (GNP) was lower. The result
derived from two assumptions in their model: one was that the burden of
dependency, the ratio of non-workers to workers in the population, was
greater under high fertility and led to reduced savings; and the other was
that investment had to be spread over larger numbers instead of raising the
amount of physical or social capital per worker. This was called ‘capital
widening versus capital deepening’; that is, if the population were growing
more slowly, the same amount of capital would be used to improve the
quality of schooling or health services received by each individual, instead
of being diluted by having to extend coverage to more people; or else there
would be more or better capital for each worker in the workplace.
These ﬁndings were hotly disputed; attempts to measure the burden-of-
dependency eﬀect on savings suggested it might be quite small, and similar
questions were raised about the capital-dilution argument. Most attempts
to measure the eﬀect of population on economic growth (either in the
aggregate or per capita) suggested the impact was small or non-existent
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(Temple, 1999) and empirical estimates were fragile, dependent on model
speciﬁcation and data used (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Recent studies have
criticized Coale and Hoover’s assumption that investments in education
and health did not promote economic growth – these investments have been
highlighted in the ‘new growth economics’ literature (for example Barro,
1997) – as well as their focus on short-run impacts of population and
without consideration of longer-run impacts.
Research in the last two decades has brought a swing of the pendulum in
the macroeconomic discussion. Bloom and Freeman (1988) and Blanchet
(1991) showed that mortality and fertility declines had diﬀerent impacts on
economic growth, so models that considered only aggregate population
were misspeciﬁed. A series of cross-country studies by Kelley and Schmidt
(1996, 2001) followed. Their initial work indicated that the positive and
negative eﬀects of population probably oﬀset each other in the 1960s and
1970s but that a net negative eﬀect in the 1980s was likely. In their more
recent work they conclude that about 20 per cent of economic growth over
the period 1960 to 1995 can be attributed to mortality and fertility declines,
with the larger contribution coming from mortality.
Rapid decline in population growth, and even more the dramatic eco-
nomic growth in East Asia in 1960–85, gave a further boost to the study of
population and development. The keys to the relationship were thought to
be decreased dependency burden (commonly known as the ‘demographic
bonus’) leading to higher savings and more investment in education. An
inﬂuential study by the World Bank (1993) argued that a large proportion
of that growth was due to improvements in education, in turn made possi-
ble by lower population growth. Although the magnitude of the contribu-
tion of education to increasing economic growth has been challenged, most
models of economic growth now include education as a contributing
factor. Analysis of the East Asian experience also focused not just on the
short-run eﬀects of population growth, as had Coale and Hoover, but also
on the intermediate eﬀects where a rising number of young people enter the
labour force, and the long-run eﬀects that occur as they retire. Savings (and
wealth) rise in the intermediate period and although they may fall in the
long run, overall the demographic bonus may account for as much as one-
third of the rapid economic growth in East Asia (Bloom and Canning,
1999).
It should be noted that these recent studies do not show a relationship
between the rate of population growth per se and economic growth; it is
rather certain demographic features and the timing of their change which
may matter: fertility, the age distribution and life expectancy. Some of
the models incorporate simultaneous relationships, with economic growth
aﬀecting the demographic variables and vice versa, giving rise to virtuous
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or vicious circles of rapid or slow growth (Bloom and Williamson, 1997;
Bloom et al., 2000; Bloom and Canning, 2001). The ‘demographic bonus’,
if real, does not confer an automatic boost to growth. Countries can use
the bonus wisely or unwisely, as evidence from Asia shows. It translates into
higher economic growth if supportive policies, markets and institutions
exist. If they do not, then the bonus will be squandered.
Poverty
It is widely believed that more rapid population growth increases poverty
by reducing real wages. However, as noted by McNicoll (1997), the rela-
tionship with poverty is ‘neither obvious nor well established’. For example,
Eastwood and Lipton (2001) identify at least 60 eﬀects of population on
poverty, and a recent study has questioned the assumption that an increase
in the labour force (from an increase in population) necessarily reduces
wages (Ahlburg, 2002). The poverty measure in these studies is generally
income poverty, rather than a broader deﬁnition such as in Sen’s capability
approach (Sen, 1985).
There have been surprisingly few attempts to estimate the impact of pop-
ulation on poverty directly, and most have been at the macro level. Three
studies of Indian states found a small positive impact of population growth
on income poverty (van de Walle, 1985; Evenson, 1993; Chelliah and
Sudarshan, 1999). In cross-country regressions Ahlburg (1996) found no
relationship between population growth and poverty. Other similar studies
found that the major variables explaining cross-country variation in
poverty were the rate of economic growth and the degree of income
inequality. In contrast, Eastwood and Lipton (2001) did ﬁnd a considerable
eﬀect of population on poverty: ‘The average (developing) country in 1980
had a poverty incidence of 18.9 per cent; had it reduced its fertility by 5 per
1000 throughout the 1980s (as did many Asian countries), this ﬁgure would
have been reduced to 12.6 per cent’ (p. 218). This estimate must be viewed
with caution for, as DeHaan and Lipton (1998) have shown, the relation-
ship between population and poverty varies considerably across regions,
countries, growth sectors and policy environments.
At the level of the household, one must take care to identify the source
of population change and the timing of the measurement of the associa-
tion between population and poverty. If family size increases because of a
birth, poverty may rise because more mouths are trying to consume the
same amount of resources. For example, in a study of 211 agricultural
households from 1975 to 1983 Gaiha and Deolalikar (1992) found that
larger families were more likely to be poor at any given point in time, and
also more likely to experience persistent poverty. But resources may not
remain constant. Members of the household may increase their labour
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supply or leave the household, assets may be sold, or the family may receive
income from relatives. All of these eﬀects (and the many more noted by
Eastwood and Lipton) inﬂuence the estimate of the relationship between
population change and poverty. The timing of the measurement of the
association is also important. Children may be the best investment the poor
can make for their old age, so that increasing current household size may
increase poverty in the short run with the expectation that it will reduce
poverty in the long run – though this expectation may be defeated if chil-
dren die early, fail to become gainfully employed, or fail to contribute
income to the household. While some attention has been paid to the impact
of an additional birth on poverty at the household level, much less atten-
tion has been paid to the impact of a death on poverty. The death of an
adult may increase the likelihood of the family becoming poor unless there
are oﬀsetting factors, such as increased resources ﬂowing in from relatives
or increased work by other family members. The empirical evidence sug-
gests that household income and asset ownership decline with the death of
an adult. For example, it was estimated that in Botswana from the mid-
1990s to the mid-2000s the poverty rate would increase by up to eight per-
centage points due to AIDS and average household income would fall by
10 per cent (Loewenson and Whiteside, 2001). The negative impacts of a
parental death can have far-reaching implications. In a study of ten African
countries, Case et al. (2004) found that orphans were less likely to be
enrolled in school than non-orphans. This reduction in human capital for-
mation raises concerns about higher poverty and lower growth in the next
generation.
While the study of the direct relationship between population change
and poverty has proven to be quite diﬃcult, there have been a large number
of studies of the eﬀects of population change on aspects of well-being
other than income poverty. There are quite a number of household studies
which show reasonably strong correlations between measures of fertility
and measures of women’s and children’s health and survival (Montgomery
and Lloyd, 1996), and between number of surviving siblings and children’s
education, especially for female children (Lloyd, 1994). While these authors
accept the fact that their studies can be criticized on methodological
grounds, they claim that they do identify underlying causal connections.
Environment
Energy, transport and industry
The main sources of air, soil and water pollution are – apart from agricul-
tural chemicals – energy, transport and industry. As developing economies
grow, they substitute modern forms of transport and energy production for
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traditional ones: cars, trucks and trains replace horse and bullock trans-
port, and coal, gas and oil take over from vegetable matter and animal
products as fuels. Manufacturing, processing, heavy industry and services
become the dominant production sectors, and even agriculture uses more
chemicals and mechanization. All these release chemical pollutants and
particulate matter into the atmosphere, soil and water courses.
But what is the role of population? In most of these productive activ-
ities it is mainly one of derived demand, and it frequently plays a relatively
modest part. The economy and the pattern of development are the power-
ful factors, with commercial energy use and modern forms of transport
often growing at several times the rate of population growth. (Dyson
et al., 2004 gives many examples for India.) At the same time, population
is itself an underlying demand factor: as populations grow there are more
people and goods to be transported, more demand for the products of
manufacturing and the like. How these factors interact is no simple
matter.
A common mistake is to take the per capita consumption for, say, energy,
and multiply by population growth to project energy consumption. Per
capita consumption will change as population and the economy grow
together; and a key aspect is the household. Since there are economies of
scale in household energy consumption, the pattern of household formation
will greatly aﬀect demand. O’Neill et al. (2001) show the very considerable
diﬀerence between household-based and population-based assessments of
energy demand. There are of course also important scale factors at levels
beyond the household.
In addition, technology changes. Most industrial processes are subject to
technological change which can reduce emissions, and the cost of reducing
them falls over time (Anderson 2001a and 2001b). Modelling the likely
output of various pollutants over time, Anderson (2004) has shown that the
early introduction of ‘clean’ technology far outweighs the inﬂuence of
population growth on a variety of emissions in energy, industry and trans-
port. The one main exception to such optimism is the small-scale sector,
which can be highly polluting, and where clean technological progress is
less apparent.
Undoubtedly population growth plays a part but how important this is
depends upon other factors. If cleaner technologies continue to be devel-
oped, and go down in price at past rates, societies in the main can enjoy
higher standards of living and modern economic growth while protecting
their environments from chemical pollution. To say that they can, however,
is not to say that they will. Where ‘dirty’ technologies are already installed
and the investments have signiﬁcant economic lives left, or where the costs
of cleaner technologies are such that government policies are required to
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ensure their introduction, but these policies are not in place, the combina-
tion of modern economic growth with rapidly growing populations can
indeed be a recipe for rising pollution.
The urban environment is subject to much the same analysis. Population
growth adds to demand for environmental resources, but often less slowly
than the pace and pattern of economic growth. Waste is a particular
problem for cities. There is much valuable experience from developing
countries in waste management, which can often be a paying proposition.
Municipal ﬁnances are, however, often weak, and planning capacity
limited. Very few cities in the developing world have coped satisfactorily
with the combination of economic growth and population growth, the
latter often at very high rates, especially where natural growth is added to
by inward migration from rural areas. Extremes of income inequality only
add to the diﬃculties. The problems are not unmanageable in principle, but
are frequently poorly managed in fact.
Water
Water diﬀers from other environmental issues. The growth of demand for
energy, manufactures and modern forms of transport is only partially
aﬀected by population growth, and there are commonly technological
‘ﬁxes’. The demand for water, though, is strongly inﬂuenced by population
growth, and the role of technology is limited. Every additional person
requires their own water supply; but more importantly for water, they have
to be fed, and in economies that are self-suﬃcient in agriculture, about four-
ﬁfths of water demand comes from agriculture, while residential use takes
up about 5 per cent, the rest being required for industry and ecological ser-
vices. If such economies wish to remain self-suﬃcient in food, they either
have to use more water, or achieve greater water eﬃciency. (Exporting other
goods and importing food is of course an option. It is tantamount to
importing water, and several countries are likely to be forced to go down
this route.)
In many countries, water is already scarce, at least regionally, or season-
ally, if not nationally or chronically. Water pollution and climate change
may also be reducing availability. While there are potential technological
means for conserving water and increasing the amount of crop yield per
unit of water, they typically oﬀer relatively small gains. It may be that
desalination of seawater will become more economic in future; at present it
is only economic where alternative sources are highly expensive. But that
apart, and then only for areas close to the sea, there is little alternative to
water regulation and pricing. These are often feasible, but politically and
socially diﬃcult. For such reasons, water is likely to be the greatest envir-
onmental challenge of population growth.
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Ecology
Studies undertaken in the 1980s indicated that population growth may have
had a detrimental impact upon renewable resources such as rainforests and
ﬁshing areas. Since the mid-1990s researchers have reached more condi-
tional conclusions. While increasing numbers inevitably place pressure on
such resources as forests, grazing land, animal habitats and the like, it
would be wrong to ‘blame’ population growth for much of the diminution
in these resources that has taken place all over the world. Much depends on
the nature of management of the resources, development of property
rights, development or adaptation of technology, land tenure relations,
population mobility, and markets and other institutions and organizations.
Many traditional systems of management have been successful in conserv-
ing natural resources over long periods, even with growing populations.
There have been well-documented cases in Africa where increasing popu-
lation density and labour availability have led to sustainable agricultural
intensiﬁcation, rather than degradation. Such cases have usually been
where land and tree tenure have been satisfactory, good market conditions
for produce have been available, and tax regimes have not punished success
(Tiﬀen et al., 1994). But the opposite has also been the case, in Africa and
elsewhere (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Jodha, 1986). Traditional systems
have often been better at sharing resources equitably than in raising their
productivity to match rising numbers.
Population growth is likely to lead to the degradation of resources where
there is open access to the resource and real rural incomes are stagnating or
falling, land tenure is insecure and there is lack of access to credit, where
alternative forms of employment are lacking, and where low levels of edu-
cation and skill limit labour mobility (Panayotou, 1996). This is not to say
that population growth typically helps; on the contrary, ceteris paribus
there will usually be less strain on resources if populations grow slowly or
not at all.
This literature can be set in a wider account of a potential beneﬁcial
inﬂuence of population growth when it leads to agricultural intensiﬁcation
and improved technology, and economies of scale. Should this occur, pop-
ulation growth could be a positive factor even macroeconomically. Boserup
made a strong claim for the importance of these eﬀects in a much-cited
study (Boserup, 1965). But while having valuable insights on such a role for
population in the long sweep of history, her account did not deal with more
negative experience in the shorter term, and Boserup herself changed her
views in later work (Boserup, 1981). It is perfectly clear from much African
experience that population growth there has commonly failed to induce
countervailing technological change in agriculture.
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